



A podcast about the economics of trade & policy
with Chad P. Bown

Episode 193. Did multinationals enforce Bangladesh's new labor law?

[Episode webpage](#)

October 29, 2023

Transcript

(lightly edited)



Chad Bown: The Rana Plaza building collapse in Bangladesh in 2013 killed over 1,100 workers and injured over 2,000 more. Many of the fatalities involved workers sewing garments at factories that were part of global supply chains. The buyers of these garments were major western-headquartered multinational companies.

In response to the tragedy, the Government of Bangladesh changed its labor law. The goal was to improve worker safety at Bangladesh's factories in these supply chains.

Importantly, one group of multinational companies promised to take on the responsibility of enforcing Bangladesh's new labor law on the factories in their supplier base.

This episode explores that promise.

Did the multinationals get their suppliers to comply with Bangladesh's new law? Did the oversight by the multinationals actually improve safety and health outcomes for workers at those factories? What was the cost of that program to the factories, as well as to the workers, in terms of their wages and jobs?



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To tackle all of this, I will be joined by a very special guest.

Laura Boudreau: Laura Boudreau, Columbia University.

Chad Bown: Laura Boudreau is an economics professor at Columbia University. She is an expert on worker rights in developing countries and on global supply chains. Today, Laura is going to share results from an amazing project that uses a randomized control trial to help us understand what foreign-headquartered multinationals can do to improve the safety and health of workers in their supply chains halfway around the world.

Chad Bown: Hi, Laura.

Laura Boudreau: Hi, Chad.

Chad Bown: You are listening to an episode of *Trade Talks*, a podcast about the economics of trade and policy. I'm your host, Chad Bown, the Reginald Jones Senior Fellow, at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.

THE EPISODE

Chad Bown: Laura, to start us off, tell us about Bangladesh and the importance of the garment sector – so sewing of clothing and textiles – to Bangladesh's exports and to the Bangladesh economy.

Laura Boudreau: Bangladesh is a low, now lower-middle income country in South Asia, and its garment sector has been around since the 1980s when a few founder families established the first firms there, and it's really been the driver of Bangladesh's industrial development and growth.

While Bangladesh is still a relatively poor country, it's now the second largest exporter of garments in the world behind China. And the garment sector is a really crucial sector for its economy. It is over 80 percent of the country's exports, and it constitutes about 13 percent of its GDP. And it's also a crucial source of employment. It employs 4 to 5 million of Bangladesh's 66.6 million workers. And it's been the first formal sector employment opportunity for women outside of the home, so it's also very important in terms of women's labor force participation, which is very low in South Asia in particular, including in Bangladesh.



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Chad Bown: What happened in 2012 and 2013 in Bangladesh?

Laura Boudreau: Between 2012 and 2013 there were a series of high-fatality industrial disasters in the sector culminating in the Rana Plaza collapse that really brought the poor working conditions and limited labor rights in the country into the international spotlight.

The Rana Plaza collapse was a collapse of a very large building complex that housed five exporting garment factories that were supplying to western buyers. These were not the shadowy subcontractors of the world. These were direct suppliers, and this collapse killed nearly 1,150 people. It injured thousands of others. And it was really the straw that broke the camel's back in terms of spurring international and local action on safety in the garment sector.

Chad Bown: Rana Plaza was an incredible tragedy. Are these sorts of workplace injuries and fatalities unique to Bangladesh or is this a global problem?

Laura Boudreau: Globally, according to the International Labor Organization (ILO), 5-7 percent of all global deaths each year are work-related, and what's more, one in nine workers experience some sort of accident on the job each year, and this burden is disproportionately borne by workers in developing countries. The mortality and injury rates are orders of magnitude larger in these contexts compared to their industrialized counterparts. So this is not simply a Bangladesh issue. This is a global issue, and it is also a broader issue in the garment sector, which is a very common sector in early industrializing states.

Chad Bown: After the Rana Plaza collapse in 2013, what was the immediate response?

Laura Boudreau: Immediately the media picked up on the responsibility of multinational buyers sourcing from Bangladesh. Also, many of Bangladesh's development partners were outraged. As an example, in the aftermath of the collapse, the US revoked Bangladesh's trade privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences, which was more of a symbolic move because it covered less than 1 percent of trade with Bangladesh. But it was a signal to the rest of the international community, to potential investors, to many different potential partners, that the US government was really pressuring the government of Bangladesh to do better by its workers.

Chad Bown: Poor working conditions are a major concern in Bangladesh, but how did it come to this? What were the underlying problems that explain why workers in Bangladesh were treated so poorly?



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Laura Boudreau: There were many contributing factors.

In developing countries, governments often lack the capacity or the political will to enforce labor regulations and other standards such as environmental standards. These events are happening in a weak enforcement environment. At the same time, we know that firms in these settings are lower productivity. We have reason to believe they have lower capabilities. And there's some evidence recently that suggests that they may also have lower capabilities to do things like comply with sometimes complicated labor regulations.

And further, there's a question of how the buyers themselves influence labor standards in developing countries. A concern that is often raised is that these buyers are seeking contracts that offer low labor costs, and so there's a worry that they spur a race to the bottom in standards by going to places that do not have this type of enforcement in place.

Chad Bown: At least three different actors here contributed to being at fault – the government of Bangladesh, local garment factory owners, but also the multinationals.

After the Rana Plaza collapse in 2013, there was all of this outrage. What was the government of Bangladesh's policy response?

Laura Boudreau: The government of Bangladesh was under intense pressure to amend its labor law. Many observers had directly linked the Rana Plaza collapse to the very limited labor rights that workers in Bangladesh enjoyed, and to the challenges of collective bargaining – i.e., very limited freedom of association rights – and to the fact that Bangladesh's labor law was behind international standards, in particular for occupational safety and health, what's referred to as OSH regulations.

In the aftermath of the collapse, the government amended its labor law in 2013 with a strong focus on freedom of association rights and on occupational safety and health. And a key provision of the amended labor law was a requirement for factories with 50 or more workers to establish occupational safety and health (OSH) committees. These would be joint, worker-manager committees that had numerous health- and safety-related responsibilities inside the factory, and this is a key provision of international labor law for occupational safety and health.

Chad Bown: Within months of the Rana Plaza collapse, the government of Bangladesh amended its labor law so that it now mandated these occupational safety and health committees. We'll come back to the details of those OSH committees in a minute.



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This 2013 policy response from the government seemed relatively swift. Was it all smooth sailing from there? What happened next?

Laura Boudreau: After the labor law was amended to require these OSH committees, local factory owners really started to push back against the government in the rules formation process. Once the law is on the books, then the government has to actually promulgate a rule that tells factory owners how to set these committees up and how to run them.

And so that process of actually putting those rules into place was extremely contentious. It dragged on for about two years. The factory owners raised several concerns, but chief among them was that setting up these OSH committees – these would be democratically selected worker representatives, to represent the interests of workers inside the factory in negotiation and conversation with management – factory owners were very scared that this would lead to increased worker collective action in the future and potentially to unionization at some point.

And they were very concerned that would put upward pressure on wages and on labor costs. My perception is that the factory owners were not incredibly concerned about the cost of these committees per se, but it was the expected cost of increased worker bargaining power in the future that they were really pushing back against.

Chad Bown: What about the multinational firms – i.e., the buyers of the garments from these Bangladesh factories? What was their initial response when the Rana Plaza collapsed in 2013?

Laura Boudreau: There was immediate pressure on the multinational buyers sourcing from Bangladesh to take action. There had already been pressure because there had been prior events in the sector, and now it was escalated. It really was turned up so high that it spurred the buyers to self-organize.

One fascinating aspect of the aftermath of Rana Plaza in Bangladesh is that you had an actual agreement between these multinationals.

In the US, you had an initiative forum called the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety. That was spearheaded by the Gap and Walmart and had other very large North American household names like Target and Costco and others join. A total of 29 in the Alliance committed to a more than five year program of improving safety in their shared (or collective) Bangladesh supplier base. There was also a European organization called the Accord.



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Together these two buyer initiatives covered about 75 percent of the garment sector, and these two initiatives actually agreed with the government of Bangladesh and the ILO that, for certain areas of health and safety, the buyers would enforce these standards on the exporters – on the supplier factories – in Bangladesh that fell under the purview of these initiatives.

At the same time, the International Labor Organization would support the government of Bangladesh to build its capacity by focusing on the 25 percent of the sector that fell outside the purview of these initiatives.

You had a unique, and somewhat extreme, sharing of enforcement authority for occupational safety and health in Bangladesh.

Chad Bown: What specifically did the Alliance – these US-based buyers like the Gap, Walmart, Costco, and Target – what did they commit to do?

Laura Boudreau: The members of the Alliance agreed to enforce uniform standards on the 600-700 factories that constituted its shared supplier base in Bangladesh.

These included commitments both to improve physical aspects of health and safety – they had a very large building safety auditing and remediation program – but also to improve these cultural and awareness aspects. And they had the program that I study – i.e., an Occupational Safety and Health Committee enforcement program.

And the really big stick or penalty that they used to incentivize suppliers to cooperate and to make progress through these programs was that they would unilaterally suspend a factory from their supplier base for fail failure to do so. This was a stick they were very willing to yield. Over the course of about 5.5 years, they suspended 179 factories.

Thinking about the economics of the incentives they're providing, this is really potentially important because from the perspective of the factory owner, it's not losing maybe one buyer, it's the loss of 29 very potentially large and valuable buyers.

Chad Bown: The Alliance sets up multiple programs. The first is to deal with physical buildings and make sure they are safe from structural issues. A second is these occupational safety and health committees. This dates back to that 2013 reform to Bangladesh's labor law.

What do these occupational safety and health committees do?



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Laura Boudreau: These committees are tasked with both improving the physical safety of the environment – the workplace environment inside factories – and also with building a safety culture.

On the former, a key provision in the regulation is that the committee conducts risk assessment of the factory at least on a quarterly basis, and then they make recommendations to management on how to resolve safety issues that they identify. Legally, management is required or supposed to by law resolve these issues or remediate these issues, and if they don't, then the members of the OSH committee have recourse to the labor inspectorate.

On those issues, I think of them as typically being more procedural safety issues – i.e., things related to operations inside the plant. But they could include larger scale issues around the safety of the building itself, of the electrical system, and so on.

I would also note that, in terms of building a safety culture, one thing that occupational safety and health experts talk about is that it's often not the physical safety of the environment, but it's human behavior that leads to a lot of injury and loss of life in industrial production settings. And so, the cultural component, the awareness component, is also really important for these committees.

Chad Bown: Now I want to turn to you, personally, for a minute. What were you doing at this time?

Laura Boudreau: The Rana Plaza collapse happened the year that I was starting my PhD at UC Berkeley's business school in their economics program. I learned about the efforts of these multinational buyer initiatives. This is where a little bit of luck comes in. I also learned that the alliance's US office was headquartered in San Francisco because that's where the Gap is headquartered, one of its major members. I was able to reach out to project managers at the Alliance and to offer to take the train across the Bay and come talk to them.

At the time that I started to talk to them, they knew that they had to enforce this OSH committee law on suppliers.

I was able to convince the Alliance to embed a randomized control trial (RCT) in its rollout of its OSH committee program to evaluate the program's effects on its supplier factories and on workers.



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Chad Bown: Tell us more about RCTs – these randomized control trials – how they work and how they can provide an important learning environment to help us understand and evaluate the impact of an economic policy.

Laura Boudreau: An RCT is a study in which a researcher wants to evaluate the causal effect of some policy or program or maybe a drug like the COVID vaccine on some outcome that they care about – i.e., continuing with the COVID vaccine example, on our likelihood of actually getting COVID and how severe COVID we would get.

The way that they evaluate the impact of that intervention is by using randomized assignment to that treatment or to a control group. And the control group is crucial because it tells us what would have happened to the treatment group if they had not received the program. And that's really the crucial piece of information we need when we want to run an evaluation to be able to understand the causal effect of that evaluation is to say, how likely would this individual have been to get COVID if they had not gotten the vaccine?

Coming back to the Alliance, I was able to convince them to randomly assign the timing at which the supplier factories would participate in the OSH committee program. The Alliance always rolled programs out in a staggered fashion. So there was an opportunity to randomly determine which factories would get it earlier versus later during that rollout.

Over the course of 2017 and 2018, a total of 84 factories participated in my randomized control trial, 41 of which were assigned to the treatment (to the OSH committee) program and 43 of which were assigned to the control. And ultimately, the 43 control factories would receive the Alliance's OSH committee program, they just were going to receive it after the end of the study.

Chad Bown: Wow. This is amazing. We have heard a lot about responsible sourcing policies by these multinational companies and efforts by researchers to try to figure out if they work and how they work, but your research is the first I have seen involving a randomized control trial to study the question. Incredible!!!

Let's turn to the treatment for these Bangladesh garment factories. What were they supposed to do under the Alliance program?

Laura Boudreau: The Alliance program was primarily an enforcement program. So they monitored very closely factories' activities to comply with the OSH committee regulation.



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This regulation had rules for how these committees were formed – i.e., crucially the worker representatives were democratically selected representatives. They had rules for how they operated – i.e., the committees were required to meet at least one in every three months and to maintain meeting minutes. And then it had many different responsibilities inside the factory – i.e., regularly checking the production floor for safety hazards and then working with management to resolve those hazards in a timely fashion. They were also responsible for conducting training, for conducting fire drills.

Chad Bown: What if the committee found that the factory was not doing something it was supposed to under Bangladesh’s law?

Laura Boudreau: The committee had to prepare an action plan for how the factory was going to come into compliance with the Bangladesh labor law, including the types of actions it would take in the factory to improve safety. I got to go to some of these factories which was really interesting, and I also got to see the types of actions that committees talked about in their meeting minutes and the priorities that they laid out in these action plans.

They're really quite wide ranging. Some examples that were quite common include things like personal protective equipment, PPE, which we're all more familiar with post COVID – i.e., making sure that workers have the required protective equipment for their tasks, things like gloves or eye guards or boots if they're handling chemicals.

Other areas were things like ventilation, so it's very hot inside these factories, making sure that there were fans, that the fans were working, that windows could be opened, et cetera.

Actually having access to pure water on the factory floor is an issue that comes up, so safe and clean drinking water. Having first aid kits that are actually stocked and available and having fire extinguishers that actually work.

Really you saw that they were identifying what was missing in their factories and then trying to fill those gaps.

Chad Bown: This takes us to your research. Before we get to it though, let's set out expectations. What's the theory? If Bangladesh factories are now treating worker standards seriously by doing what the Alliance says and having these OSH committees, what should we expect will happen? What should happen to workers?



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Laura Boudreau: The predictions for workers are positive in terms of having better health and safety outcomes. If we could collect objective measures of health and safety inside the factory, we should see unambiguous improvements.

In the context of OSH committees, measurement is a little complicated because we also think workers may increase their reporting of things like accidents and injuries, and so that's something I had to think a lot about during measurement. But we do think there should be these benefits for workers.

Chad Bown: That is worker safety. What does the theory say should happen to worker productivity and things like wages, labor costs and employment? The question is, how should the factory owners feel about the formation of these OSH committees?

Laura Boudreau: On the factory side – i.e., on the firm side – the effects are much more ambiguous.

Starting with labor productivity, there are reasons to think that OSH committees could actually improve labor productivity. If we think that healthy and safe conditions could mean that workers may be absent less, they may experience fewer injuries, and so have less lost time on the job. There are other channels. Maybe they feel safer, and so they have better mental health, so they're more productive.

On the flip side, there are several reasons why these committees could erode labor productivity. Maybe by requiring workers to wear a lot of protective equipment, they slow workers down. Maybe workers don't like all these safety rules that they have to follow and it makes them less happy to be on the job and that makes them less productive. That could mean that labor productivity goes down. On net it's ambiguous and we need to take that to the data.

For wages and employment, the predictions depend on the functioning or the structure of the labor market.

If labor markets are competitive and OSH committees improve working conditions for workers, then because of what economists call compensating differentials, we would expect wages to fall and eventually employment to fall. If, however, employers have some labor market power – i.e., some ability to set wages in the labor market – then it's possible that working conditions could improve without wages falling or employment being affected.



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On net, the impacts on factories are much more ambiguous than those for workers. And I think this is part of why factory owners resisted this policy change in the first place.

But also this ambiguity means it's an empirical question, and we need to go to the data.

Chad Bown: OK, let's go to the data then. You were able to randomly assign Alliance oversight of these OSH committees to different factories.

The first question is whether the Alliance oversight mattered. Compared to the control group, were the factories that received the Alliance enforcement more likely to comply with Bangladesh's law?

Laura Boudreau: Factories that were randomly assigned to receive the enforcement were significantly more compliant with the OSH committee regulation compared to the control group.

These OSH committees were much more active in the treatment factories. They were meeting more frequently. They went from being about 15 percent likely to conduct a risk assessment to almost 60 percent of them conducting risk assessments. You can think of this as taking factories that had OSH committees that existed on paper and actually mobilizing them inside the factory.

Chad Bown: OK, so there is evidence that the oversight program did make the Bangladesh factory owners more likely to follow the law. But so far, this could just mean more meetings and more paperwork, I suppose.

What was the impact of the oversight on workers? How did you measure worker safety and health, and what did you find?

Laura Boudreau: I first collect objective measures of physical factory safety. So I actually sent a trained social compliance assessor to the factory floor to check conditions using a standardized checklist that many very large buyers use in their compliance assessments. Using this objective measure of safety, I find that the treatment factories significantly outperform the controls.

They were significantly more safe based on these objective measures.

For example, workers were 9-18 percent more likely to be found using machines with appropriate machine guards in place and to be wearing required protective equipment. These



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were not transformational improvements, but contributing to improving the overall safety climate in the firm.

I also look at measures that are more subject to these kinds of reporting concerns that I raised earlier. If workers are more willing to come forward and report accidents, it's going to be much harder for me to know how the committees are affecting the true accident rate inside the factory.

So I use the best source that I think I have access to which is that most of these plants – not all – have medical clinics on site and they keep records of visitors to the medical clinic. And these records are nice because they're not used for any sort of formal reporting on accidents or injuries. There are not really stakes attached to having an accident or a worker showing up in these logs.

I find that workers are 15-16 percent less likely to seek medical care inside the factory, which is consistent with the scale of the effects I was finding in terms of the physical safety improvements.

Chad Bown: You found that not only are these firms complying with the new Bangladesh law, but the oversight is also causing improvements to worker safety and health.

But what about the costs to the factory owners? This is what they were most worried about. Did these OSH committees hurt worker productivity, and what did you find was the impact on wages and employment?

Laura Boudreau: Using standard statistical or econometric techniques, I find no evidence of effects on labor productivity, wages, or employment. If anything, it seems like for labor productivity, if they have any effects on labor productivity, they're probably positive, but quite small.

From the perspective of the factory owners, the evidence suggests that there's no reason, at least in the short run – and this is a caveat because I'm studying short run effects – for these owners to be concerned that these committees are going to negatively affect their businesses.

Chad Bown: You said short run there. Tell us more about the caveats and what you can't learn from these results, especially when it comes to the longer-term worries of the factory owners and their labor costs.



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Laura Boudreau: One caveat about my findings is that the concern that employers raised during the rules setting process was really related to possible longer-run effects on workers' collective action and unionization and putting upward pressure on wages.

I'm able to study these committees' impacts over the course of about 11 months (i.e., just under a year), but I'm not able, using my data, to look at longer run effects.

Chad Bown: Let's turn to a separate issue and let me play devil's advocate for a second. Maybe what we have here is that these factories behave during this period when the Alliance is engaged in intense oversight. But maybe once that enforcement by the buyers stops, the factories then just go back to their bad old ways.

What did you find about that potential concern?

Laura Boudreau: This OSH committee program was a six month program and then after factories completed it, they went back to what the Alliance called regular monitoring. They could still be spot checked by the Alliance, but they weren't being nearly as intensively monitored on these OSH committees.

And I go back and measure outcomes again about four months after the end of that intensive enforcement period, and I still find that the treatment factories are significantly more compliant than the controls with the OSH committee regulation. There's still evidence of improvements in health and safety, although they're no longer statistically significant, so it's suggestive evidence.

The more positive results on things like worker's awareness and job satisfaction continue. And I don't find any evidence of negative effects for factories. Labor, productivity, wages and employment – the effects are all still zero or close to zero.

And so it seems like these committees are still contributing to improved outcomes for workers without imposing meaningful costs on employers.

Chad Bown: Again, these results are incredible. Now I want you to take a step back. How much of what we learn from your study of Bangladesh do you think we can apply either to other supply chains – beyond garments – or to other countries – beyond Bangladesh?



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Laura Boudreau: First, I want to make sure that I'm clear, the effects that I find are small but meaningful improvements in health and safety. They're not transformational in terms of, taking an ugly duckling factory and turning it into a really shiny prince factory. But they are improving health and safety in the setting.

In terms of how much what we learn from Bangladesh is relevant for other value chains or for other countries, there are reasons to think that the effects that I find might be upper bounds. There was a lot of coordination post Rana Plaza. There was a lot of pressure to improve conditions. Maybe the incentives were aligned between the factories because of the fact that Bangladesh is very dependent on this particular sector for its economy.

On the flip side, you might think that the effects I find are potentially lower bounds because there was so much pressure on safety. Maybe the factories were already improving safety so much anyway that the margin for these committees to make improvements was smaller.

What I can say is that the types of activities by these buyers are certainly not unique to Bangladesh, and OSH committees are also certainly not unique to Bangladesh. The top five exporters of apparel in the world are in Asia. Four out of five of them have mandatory OSH committee regulations on the books. The one that doesn't is China.

The members of the Alliance and many other multinational buyers have supplier codes of conduct in place. They participate in many different initiatives to set and enforce standards in developing countries.

In the context of apparel, Bangladesh was actually considered to be a laboratory and now there's a very similar initiative modeled on the Alliance that covers apparel and home goods products in other Asian countries – i.e., India, Pakistan, and others as well.

These types of private sector enforcement activities are part of doing business, at least in these buyer driven global value chains.

Chad Bown: These results on the effectiveness of the Alliance oversight program are so important. But are there risks to turning over enforcement of Bangladesh's labor laws to multinational companies?

Laura Boudreau: So one interesting aspect of the setting was that there was coordination between the government and the buyer initiatives about who would be enforcing certain



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health and safety standards on the exporting factories. And, in this example, you had the buyers playing a very important role, at least in the short to medium term.

And while this type of coordination seems desirable, its effectiveness is really an open question. We may worry that in the long run, this may undermine incentives of the government to build its own capacity to enforce. Ultimately that should be the goal for the government to have that responsibility and for these types of buyer initiatives to provide a temporary, short-to-medium term solution.

Chad Bown: Today, we are seeing a lot of policy initiatives in buyer countries – like the United States and also in Europe – to interject worker and environmental standards into their trade agreements. One of the things governments are doing is attempting to shift some of the enforcement and responsibility for monitoring onto these multinational firms. This would be moving beyond the voluntary, collective action like we had with the Alliance to mandatory, policy actions by western governments requiring multinationals to do this sort of thing and penalizing them somehow if they do not.

Laura, as my last question, if you got an audience with these policymakers, what would you tell them are the main takeaways from your results?

Laura Boudreau: There's at least one key takeaway about OSH committees themselves, which is that they can be an important component of improving health and safety. They can't be the only approach to improving health and safety, but I think they're an important part of a broader set of policies that need to be in place to have safe working conditions.

In the context of Bangladesh, they were starting from a place of very, very low dialogue between workers and employers. And I see a little bit of improvement in worker voice in the time span that I study. But I still think it's an important question of how to increase worker participation in OSH committees and other worker management committees, at least in contexts like Bangladesh, where there's no history of workers and managers sitting across the table from each other.

Turning to the multinationals' role in enforcing this labor law, I think this project demonstrates that multinationals' enforcement of labor laws can contribute to improved compliance outcomes in the context of weak state enforcement – in other words, that global value chains can be a conduit for upgrading labor standards in developing countries.



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But at the same time, even when multinationals engage in these types of enforcement activities – which not all of them do, but many do – we should not expect them to achieve full compliance.

First, monitoring is costly, even for these very large firms. These suppliers are located in Bangladesh. Many of these firms are located in the US and Europe and many other countries.

Further, they may not be the only buyer supplying or sourcing from a particular exporter. In the context of economics, we think of this as raising the issue of the externalities involved in monitoring. I.e., when I monitor, all of the other buyers benefit; and then we think there's going to be an under provision of monitoring.

And then finally, the buyers are deciding what's optimal for the buyer, not for society. We may not expect them to set the level of enforcement where the Bangladeshi society might want it or where the US society might want, it if we were doing this in US.

It's complicated. It's nuanced – in terms of the potential impacts that these buyer enforcement initiatives can have.

Chad Bown: Laura, thank you very much.

Laura Boudreau: Thank you so much, Chad. This was great.

GOODBYE FOR NOW

Chad Bown: And that is all for *Trade Talks*.

A huge thanks to Laura Boudreau at Columbia University. Do check out Laura's paper titled "Multinational enforcement of labor law: Experimental evidence on strengthening occupational safety and health committees." It will soon be published in the journal *Econometrica*.

Thanks to Melina Kolb, our supervising producer. Thanks to Sarah Tew, on digital. As always, thanks to Collin Warren, our audio guy.

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<insert super funny double underscore joke here>. ■



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Read more...

- Boudreau, Laura. Forthcoming. [Multinational enforcement of labor law: Experimental evidence on strengthening occupational safety and health \(OSH\) committees](#). *Econometrica*.